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This study examines whether the trade credit provision is affected by customers’ 
operational efficiency. We link the supplier firms with their major customers using 
the Customer Segment database in order to identify the trade credit provision for each 
pair of supplier-customer relationships. While suppliers have the incentive to provide 
trade credit to high-quality customers in order to increase market share, excess trade 
credit would also harm the suppliers once the customers default. Our empirical results 
indicate that operational efficiency and trade credit are positively associated. This 
finding supports the view that suppliers tend to select and provide trade credit to high 
productive customers. Moreover, we find that both suppliers and customers can 
benefit from more trade credit provision when the customer is more productive. The 
result is consistent with the supply chain cooperation view. Furthermore, we 
document the effect of customer’s operational efficiency and trade credit provision on 
the share of profit between supplier and customer under different situations such as 
when the supplier has higher bargaining power, lower cost of borrowing as well as 
lower customer concentration. The study contributes to the literature of trade credit by 
introducing an additional determinant. Moreover, it provides implication to the trade 
contract for non-financial firms. 
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CUSTOMER’S OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND TRADE CREDIT 
PROVISION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Trade credit plays an important role in providing short-term liquidity for 
customer firms by extending the payment day after sales. According to the 
aggregated balance sheet of the United State, the trade payable of nonfinancial 
companies is 2 times their debt securities in Q3 of 2018 (Financial Accounts of the 
United States, 2018). Yang and Birge (2017) document that 33% of the total 
liabilities of public retailers are identified as accounts payable in North America. It 
implies that non-financial companies tend to provide liquidity to their customers 
through trade credit. Although trade credit is a major source of short-term financing, 
it receives less attention than other financing tools such as bank loans and bonds. 
Since trade credit is economically important, what is the optimal trade credit 
provision becomes a critical issue. Prior literature documents the determinants and 
the roles of trade credits. For the supplier-side determinants, Schwartz (1974) shows 
that suppliers who can easily raise capital tend to extend more trade credit to attract 
customers. They treat trade credit as a marketing tool to attract customers. Lee, Zhou 
and Wang (2017) suggest competition and customer concentration determine trade 
credit provision. Suppliers provide less trade credit provision when they are facing 
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intensive horizontal competition. Ng et al. (1999) show that suppliers tend to extend 
trade credit to customers with a higher reputation. For the demand-side determinants, 
Ferris (1981) argues that trade credit can improve customers’ cash management and 
the transaction cost can be reduced through transaction pooling. In other words, trade 
credit provides customers better cash management by allowing them to pay all the 
bills at the same time. Second, customers require trade credit from suppliers because 
of their difficulty to access bank credit. Given that bank regulations are strict, 
customers without long term operating track records or adequate collateral are 
difficult to receive bank loans. Suppliers become a financial intermediary between 
banks and their customers as suppliers have better information about customers than 
banks. On the roles of trade credit, Lee et al. (2017) suggest abnormal trade credit 
provision (either longer or shorter than industry average trade credit provision) 
increases the switching cost of customers. It provides a reason for suppliers to 
increase the unit price of the product and harms customers’ profits. On the other hand, 
Rui and Lai (2015) document that the severity of the moral hazard of suppliers can 
be reduced by trade credit. Suppliers tend to not involve in adulteration and produce 
non-defective products when customers have not paid for the products yet. Yang and 
Birge (2017) suggest that trade credit can serve as a risk-sharing tool among 
suppliers and customers. It allows customers to partially share the demand risk with 
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suppliers and improves supply chain efficiency. The finance literature also studies the 
impact of the regulatory restriction on trade credit. For example, the regulation of 
trade credit restriction in Chile reduces the number of purchases while similar 
restriction in French increases the new entry of supplier firms and reduces the 
customer default risk (Breza and Liberman, 2017; Barrot, 2016). There is no 
consensus on the optimal trade credit provision for suppliers and customers. A 
suboptimal trade credit decision could harm the profitability of supply chain partners. 
While the literature focuses on firms with short-term liquidity constraints (Fabbri and 
Menichini, 2010; Lee et al., 2017), we examine the association between customers’ 
operating performance and trade credit. 
In operations management literature, some studies use analytical models to 
illustrate the relationship between firms’ operational policy and trade credit. Haley 
and Higgins (1973) show that inventory policy and trade credit policy should be 
determined simultaneously in order to achieve the optimality. Customers should 
decide the order quantity and payment period at the same time. Chod (2017) 
document that debt financing retailers tend to take more risk by purchasing products 
with high-profit margins and low salvage value in which the inventory policy is 
distorted by debt financing. Trade credit could mitigate the distortion by borrowing 
goods instead of borrowing cash limits. Besides the demand side of trade credit, 
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Bierman and Hausman (1970) show that suppliers need to consider the potential 
future sales when making trade credit decisions. Few studies document the criteria or 
quantitative models that are used to make credit decisions (Lieber and Orgler 1975; 
Rosenberg and Gleit 1994). However, there is no systematic empirical evidence 
documenting that suppliers prefer what kind of operational characteristics when 
making trade credit decisions. 
In this paper, we propose that the operational efficiency of customers affects the 
supplier’s decision of the trade credit provision. Because of the risk concern, 
suppliers tend to extend trade credit to the customers with good quality and high 
reputations. Moreover, it is common for suppliers to attract and build up a long-term 
relationship with high-quality customers using trade credit (Schwartz 1974). It is 
expected that the customer’s operational efficiency is positively associated with the 
trade credit obtained from the supplier. For the impact of trade credit, it is expected 
that the supplier who provides more trade credit to the customer with high 
operational efficiency could improve the supply chain profitability. Lee et al. (2017) 
document the collaborative effect along the supply chain. If suppliers provide 
reasonable trade credit to their customers, the supply chain profit increases and it 
benefits both suppliers and customers. We further propose that extending more trade 
credit to the productive customer is another form of supply chain cooperation and 
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generates collaborative effects. Suppliers could be benefited from making more sales 
from productive customers and customers enjoy better cash management and free 
from short-term financial constraints. 
Although there are motives for the suppliers to extend trade credit to productive 
customers, other factors could affect the final trade credit decision. First, trade credit 
is not free of charge. The most common term of trade credit is 2/10 net 30 (i.e. 2% 
discount for payment within 10 days or pay the net amount in 30 days). If customers 
want to exercise the trade credit provision, they are required to pay a higher price. If 
the cost (i.e. increase in the price) exceeds the benefit (i.e. financial flexibility), 
costumers would not take the trade credit. Second, customers with high operational 
efficiency tend to have fewer tangible assets as collateral. Suppliers might not extend 
trade credit to those companies. Third, customers with high operational efficiency are 
associated with higher operational risk. Our definition of efficiency is high 
input-to-output ratio. To maintain high operational efficiency, managers have to cut 
costs by reducing assets such as keeping less strategic inventory (Anand et al 2008). 
These firms are vulnerable when facing external disruption to the supply chain. 
Given that the operations of these firms have higher uncertainty, suppliers might 
extend less trade credit to them. Since there are several opposite arguments, it is an 
empirical question whether suppliers tend to extend more trade credit to customers 
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with high operational efficiency. 
Our study is closely related to the literature on trade credit. We identify an 
additional determinant of trade credit by showing the effects of customers’ 
operational performance on trade credit provision. Understanding the link between 
operational performance and trade credit can help managers to determine the optimal 
trade credit provision, especially when the customer is facing operational problems. 
Among many tradeoffs between terms and provisions in negotiating a trade contract, 
product price and trade credit are the most important because they directly affect the 
profitability and risk of the company. Moreover, we document the impact of trade 
credit on the performance of the supply chain stakeholders. It suggests that a 
corporation along the supply chain by extending trade credit can benefit both 
suppliers and customers. Furthermore, we find that such benefit is more pronounced 
to suppliers when the supplier has lower bargaining power in terms of size, higher 
customer concentration, and higher cost of borrowing. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 hypothesizes the determinant and 
impact of trade credit. Section 3 is the methodology of testing the hypotheses. 
Section 4 reports the summary statistics. Section 5 shows the data and results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
To reduce potential default risks, suppliers are likely to extend trade credit to 
those customers with a high reputation or good track record (Ng et al., 1999). 
However, suppliers extend trade credit to even loss-making customers when they 
believe that those customers have high potential future growth (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997), implying that historical profitability is not the only indicator for suppliers to 
decide the trade credit provision. Generally, suppliers acquire superior information 
from the customers ahead of the banks by tracking their past payment records (Emery, 
1984). High operational efficiency customers tend to have better performance 
indicators such as high inventory turnover. Combining the accounting data in 
customers’ financial statements and the soft information from the past transections, 
suppliers could evaluate the default risk and future performance of customers. 
Bierman and Hausman (1970) suggest that suppliers would consider both current 
default risk and future potential sales from customers when making trade credit 
decisions. It implies that trade credit can be used to attract customers to build up a 
long-term relationship.  
On the other hand, operational efficiency and trade credit could be negatively 
associated. First, high operational efficiency implies fewer tangible assets. For 
example, a firm with high inventory efficiency tends to have a very low inventory 
9 
 
level. Given that tangible assets can be served as collateral, firms with high 
operational efficiency would receive less trade credit. Second, firms with high 
operational efficiency tend to have a higher operational risk. To maintain a high 
input-to-output ratio (i.e. high operational efficiency), managers have to take risky 
projects to boost the revenue and keep the input at the minimum level. However, 
these firms are vulnerable when facing external disruption. For example, supply 
chain disruption such as embargo of strategic parts from supplier’s country could 
affect the whole production and the payments to other suppliers since these firms 
keep the strategic inventory at a minimum level. Given that the operations of these 
firms are easily affected by the external environment, suppliers might extend less 
trade credit to them.  
Although operational efficiency is associated with a higher risk, suppliers would 
still build up relationships with productive customers using trade credit. Since 
operational efficiency is associated with future performance, suppliers have the 
incentive to provide more trade credit to customers with high operational efficiency. 
We thus, develop the first hypothesis on the determinant of trade credit: 
H1: Operational efficiency is positively associated with trade credit provision 
The second and third hypothesis is related to the interaction effect of trade credit 
and operational efficiency on firm performance. Trade credit and bank borrowing are 
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major sources of short-term liquidity of non-financial companies. Generally, trade 
credit provision is flexible because the customers can choose to execute an additional 
provision or not according to their liquidity needs. For example, the common 
industry practice of “2/10 net 30” means that customers can enjoy a 2% discount if 
pay within 10 days and need to pay the net amount within 30 days. Customers can 
realize their actual demand after the 10 days and determine whether to extend the 
trade credit or not. Moreover, suppliers tend to provide a more generous credit 
provision than banks because suppliers want to maintain long-term supply chain 
relationships (Wilner, 2000).  
However, trade credit does not necessarily benefit customers. For example, the 
suppliers can raise the price of the product when offering trade credit to justify the 
increased risk (Zhou and Groenevelt, 2008). Moreover, trade credit can be used to 
price-discriminate financially constrained customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). In 
addition, more trade credit increases the switching costs of customers. Lee et al. 
(2017) suggest that trade credit prevents customers to search for cheaper substitutes. 
The flexibility and the generous provision improve profitability while the increase in 
the product price and switching costs harm the customers. As a result, the impact of 
trade credit on customer earnings performance becomes uncertain. 
Prior literature documents that supply chain cooperation by providing industrial 
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average trade credit can improve customer performance (Lee et al., 2017). We 
propose that a supplier provides more trade credit to the firm with high operational 
efficiency that can be treated as a form of cooperation. In particular, customers can 
enjoy more flexible cash management from trade credit. Reduction in transaction 
costs from transaction pooling and flexible payment terms helps customers to 
improve their profitability. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H2: The profit of customer-firm with high operational efficiency is higher when the 
supplier firm provides more trade credit  
Similarly, we propose that trade credit also affects supplier financial 
performance. Providing extra trade credit can be costly to suppliers because of 
additional financing costs. Moreover, suppliers may suffer from an increase in 
default risk since longer credit provision means higher cash flow uncertainty from 
credit sales. The effects increase the costs and harm the profitability of suppliers. On 
the other hand, trade credit can be used to enhance supply chain efficiency by sharing 
the risk from financially constrained firms to a healthy firm (Yang and Birge, 2017). 
Moreover, Kouvelis and Zhao (2012) document that suppliers can benefit from using 
more trade credit when customers have a healthy financial situation. Although there 
are opposite arguments about the impacts of trade credit on financial performance, 
cooperation along the supply chain should benefit both suppliers and customers 
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especially when the suppliers provide reasonable trade credit provision based on 
customers’ operational performance. Further, suppliers can be benefited from 
building a long-term relationship with productive trading partners. The future sales 
of these suppliers will be higher than those without considering the OE of customers 
or do not extant trade credit to productive customers. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is developed: 
H3: The profit of the supplier-firm is higher when it provides more trade credit to the 
customer with high operational efficiency 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
The listed firms in the US are required by SFAS No. 131 to disclose the 
information of customers who account for more than 10% of their total sales. The 
supplier-customer relationship data can be obtained from the Compustat Customer 
Segment database. We match the supplier firms (supplier i) with customer firms 
(customer j) and obtain the sales generated by particular customers (csales). Then, 
we merge the firm-specific information of both parties with the supplier-customer 
link. Each observation contains a supply chain which is defined as a link between 
one supplier and one customer in a particular year. The observations without 
customer sales are dropped. Following prior studies, we exclude the banking and 
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financial industries from our analysis. 
3.2. Measurement of trade credit 




× 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)           (1) 
where 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the total sales of supplier i in year t; and 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the accounts 
receivable of supplier i. Since a supplier can have multiple major customers, this 
measure enables us to quantify approximately the trade credit provided by a supplier 
to a particular customer. This measure assumes that the amount of trade credit is 
proportionally distributed to major customers according to the supply chain sales (i.e. 
csales). Given that the total trade credit amount is mechanically associated with 
inventory turnovers of customers1, we use an additional trade credit measure which is 
scaled by the supplier’s sales to mitigate the mechanical effect between trade credit 
and inventory turnover. 
While some of the earlier studies use account payable of customer-firm as a 
proxy of trade credit (e.g. Yang and Birge, 2017), we employ supplier account 
receivable as our primary measure, and it is also widely accepted in the related 
literature. It is because each observation in our data set is a supply chain in which a 
 
1 If a customer has more cost of goods sold (e.g. because of more sales), it tends to have higher 
inventory turnover (IT = cost of goods sold / average inventory) and more credit purchase (or trade 
credit) than other firms. We use trade credit to sales ratio (i.e. the proportion of credit purchases to 
total purchases) to proxy for trade credit. 
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single customer can trade with multiple suppliers. Using 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡  enables us to 
distinguish the trade credits from different suppliers.  
3.3. Measurement of Operational Efficiency  
We use two metrics (1) standardized inventory turnover (sITc) and (2) total 
factor productivity (TFP) to measure the operational efficiency of a firm. Prior 
literature has widely use inventory turnover as a measure of productivity (Chen et al. 
2007). Since different industry has different inventory practices, we standardized the 
inventory turnover (i.e. subtracting the industry mean and deflated by 
industry-standard deviation) so that we could compare the metrics across different 
firms in different industry and time.  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 (𝑠𝐼𝑇𝑐) =  
𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑇𝑡
𝑠𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑇𝑡
                         (2) 
The second measure is total factor productivity (TFP) which captures the 
general level of operational efficiency instead of single-factor productivity. TFP 
considers a set of inputs including labor, inventory, and capital. It measures how 
efficient a firm convert their inputs into outputs (e.g. revenue). Thus, TFP can 
overcome the different intensity problems of excluded input usage. For example, 
firm A is a capital-intensive firm while firm B is a labor-intensive firm. Given that 
both firm A and firm B have the same amount of labor, labor productivity would be 
different since the importance of the labor of firm B is higher than firm A. 
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Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Lee and Kesavan (2019), we 
employ the following equations to define TFP. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,          (3) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = exp(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽0̂ − 𝛽1̂𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽2̂𝑘𝑖𝑡),       (4) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the log of value-added for firm i in time t; 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡 are the log of 
labor and capital inputs. The error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡) consists of two parts: Ωit, the TFP, and 
𝜂𝑖𝑡, the unexpected idiosyncratic productivity shock. The parameter (𝛽?̂?) is estimated 
every year using all data available up until year t to reduce look-ahead bias. Given 
that different industry has a different level of total factor productivity, we standardize 
the TFP similar to our first measure sITc using the following equation.  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑝) =  
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡
𝑠𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡
.         (5) 
3.4 Model Specification 
The following panel-regression tests the factors that associated with the decision 
of trade credit provision: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑂𝐸𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,      (6) 
where 𝑂𝐸𝑗𝑡−1 is our proxies of operational efficiency (sITc and stfp); and 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a 
set of control variables that correlated to trade credit and (or) operational efficiency 
(OE). We control the market share of supplier and customer (MSs and MSc), 
customer concentration (cc), relative tangible asset (TAR), relative cost of borrowing 
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(COBR), customer bank credit ratio (BDR), supply chain sales (ln_csale) and the 
duration of the relationship (tenure) and one year lagged trade credit. It is worth 
noting that we use lagged independent variables to mitigate the effect of reverse 
causality and illustrate the predictable power of operational efficiency to trade credit. 
We also include the supply chain pair fixed effect (𝐹𝑖𝑗) and year fixed effect (𝑇𝑡) into 
our analysis. According to Hypothesis 1, 𝛼1 should be positive. 
To deal with endogeneity, we employ transportation infrastructure development 
in the city that the customers operate as an instrumental variable for operational 
efficiency. If the transportation infrastructure is well developed, it is likely for the 
firm to have higher productivity. Meanwhile, transportation infrastructure 
development does not affect the decision of trade credit provision. Thus, 
transportation infrastructure development is a suitable instrumental variable for 
operational efficiency. The transportation data is obtained from State Transportation 
Statistics which contains state-level panel data from 2003 to 2014.  
For H2 and H3, we use the following regression to examine the interaction 
effect of trade credit and operational efficiency on firm performance.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎∈(𝑖,𝑗);𝑡 = 𝛽1TCijt−1 + 𝛽2OEit−1 + 𝛽3TCijt−1 × OEit−1 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (7) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑡 ) is the return on asset or return on equity ratio of 
suppliers (customers). According to H2 and H3, it is expected that suppliers provide 
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more credit to customers who have higher OE can benefit both parties in terms of 
earnings performance. As a result, the coefficient of the interaction term (i.e. 𝛽3) 
should be positive.  
3.5 Additional tests 
We conduct serval additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results. First, 
we employ additional proxies for trade credit such as replacing the account 
receivable with a one-year lagged account receivable of the supplier in the 
calculation of trade credit. Another proxy of trade credit is account payable of the 
customer. Using both proxies, we re-examine equation (6) and (7). The results are 
presented in Section 5.2.2. 
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our dataset includes 26,979 supply chain observations which are extracted from 
the Compustat Segment database from 1977 to 2016. Table 1 reports the summary 
statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis. The mean of the trade credit 
proxy is 1.15 with a standard deviation of 2.24. The normal level of the mean of sITc 
and stfp is zero because they are standardized. Since both measures are calculated 
before matching the supply chain data, the mean of sITc and stfp in our matched 
panel data are -0.04 and -0.58, respectively. It implies that the firms in our final 
matched dataset have slightly less operational efficiency. The average supply chain 
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relationship is 4.7 years. The summary statistics of trade credit (TC) and other 
variables are similar to prior studies (Lee et al. 2017, Lee and Kesavan 2019)2. Table 
2 is the correlation matrix, which reports the relationship between our operations 
efficiency and trade credit proxies. It shows that the standardized inventory turnovers 
(sITc) and standardized total factor productivity (stfp) of customers are positively 
associated with our trade credit measure (TC), thereby indicating that suppliers tend 
to extend trade credit to customers with high operational efficiency.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Main Results  
Table 3 reports the empirical analysis on the relationship between the 
operational efficiency proxies (sITc and stfp) and the measurement of trade credit. 
Column [1] reports the results of the assessment of equation (6) using sITc as an 
operational efficiency proxy. The coefficient of sITc is positive and significant (α = 
0.025, p < 0.05). Thus, firms with high operational efficiency tend to have higher 
trade credit provision from their suppliers. Similarly, column [3] reports that stfp is 
positively associated with trade credit provision (α = 0.088, p < 0.05). The results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
 
2 We choose to report the variables after taking natural logarithm while Lee et al. report the raw value. 
After transforming to raw values, our summary statistics of key variables are similar to those in Lee et 
al. (2017) and Lee and Kesavan (2019). 
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Given that our measure of trade credit could be correlated with the sales of 
suppliers, we reexamined models [1] and [3] using trade credit to sales ratio 
(TC_sale). Results in columns [2] and [4] are generally consistent with the findings 
in columns [1] and [3]. In general, all our results support Hypothesis (1) which 
implies that suppliers tend to provide more trade credit to productive customers. 
5.2 Additional Test 
In this section, we tested whether the results in Section 5.1 are robust to 
alternative design choices. Although we controlled for the known determinants of 
trade credit, the problem of omitted correlated variables could remain. Moreover, the 
operational efficiency of customers can be endogenously determined. Thus, we 
discuss these issues in this section. 
5.2.1 Instrumental Variables (Transportation Infrastructure) 
Because trade credit provides customers more flexibility which could result in 
higher operational efficiency, reverse causality is a potential issue. To address the 
endogeneity problem, we employed an instrumental variable approach (Larcker and 
Rusticus 2010). We used the state-level transportation infrastructure, which is 
measured by the total length of major roads to the total population of the state, as the 
instrumental variable. It fulfills two important requirements for an instrument. First, 
transportation infrastructure is strongly associated with operational efficiency since 
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better road condition helps firms to operate in a more flexible way. For example, Shi 
et al. (2018) show a strong positive association between transportation infrastructure 
and firm’s productivity. Second, the transportation infrastructure unlikely affects the 
trade credit decision from the supplier firm. Hence, both properties of a valid 
instrument are present, that is, exogeneity and a strong correlation with the variables 
of interest. 
We estimated the following first stage OLS regression to extract the 
exogenous portion of the operational efficiency:  
𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡      (8) 
where transportation is the natural logarithm of the length of major urban road to 
population ratio of the state that the customers incorporate. We extract the 
transportation data from Highway Statistics Series Publications which is published 
by the “U.S Department of Transportation - Federal Highway Administration”. The 
data includes the total length of roads in each state by functions from 1980 to 2016. 
Since a state with a higher population should have a longer length of the road, we 
divide the road length with the population to capture the real condition of 
transportation infrastructure. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the control variables that are defined similarly to 
equation (6). Using the predicted values from equation (8), we estimated the 
following regression:  
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𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑝𝑗𝑡−1[𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡] + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡      (9) 
The variable of interest (𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑝𝑗𝑡−1[𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡]) is the predicted value from 
equation (8), which is considered as the exogenous portion of the operational 
efficiency of customers.  
Table 8 shows the results of our instrumental variables tests. The exogenous 
instrument, transportation, is positively and significantly associated with operational 
efficiency proxy in the first stage with high explanatory power (adjusted r-squared = 
84.8%). It implies that better transportation infrastructure promotes operational 
efficiency. Given that the F-statistic is greater than 10 (42.420 and 42.712 for model 
[2] and [3] respectively), it does not suffer from weak instruments’ choice. Results of 
the second-stage analysis reported in column [2] and [3] are consistent with the 
results in Section 5.1.   
5.2.2 Alternative Proxy Operational Efficiency and Trade Credit  
Since different customers have different influence on their suppliers, we adjust 
the operational efficiency proxies by multiplying the supply chain sales to suppliers’ 
sales ratio. This adjustment implies that the operational efficiency of customers who 
account for more sales to their suppliers have a higher impact on trade credit 






× 𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡)  
where 𝑐𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the supply chain sales; 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡is the total suppliers’ sales; and 
𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡is either sITc or stfp. 
Table IA 1 examines the relationship between the weighted adjusted standardized 
inventory turnovers of customers (w_sITc) as well as weighted adjusted standardized 
total factor productivity (w_stfp) and the trade credit measure. Results show that 
customers with high w_sITc or w_stfp are likely to have higher trade credit. The 
coefficients on w_sITc and w_stfp are positive and significant (coefficient = 0.099 
and 0.228 and p-value <0.05, <0.1, respectively). 
Giver that some empirical studies in operations management employ account 
payable as a proxy for trade credit, we examine whether our results remain consistent 
when using alternative measures (Yang and Birge 2017, Chod et al. 2019). We 
replace our trade credit proxy with the natural logarithm of account payable of 
customers (ln_apc) and customers’ accounts payable to cost of goods sold ratio 
(apc_cogsc) and re-examine equation (6). Table IA 2 shows a significant positive 
coefficient on stfp which is consistent with previous findings.  
Thus, the results are generally consistent with the findings in Section 5.1, thereby 




5.3 The effect of Operational Efficiency and Trade Credit on Profitability of 
Customers and Suppliers 
Table 4 reports the results of equation (6) which examines the interaction effect 
of operational efficiency and trade credit on the profitability of customers and 
suppliers. In the analysis, we employ an indicator variable (high_stfp), which is equal 
to 1 when the stfp of the customer is higher than the median. The interaction term 
“high_stfp x TC” captures the combining effect of high operational efficiency and 
high trade credit. Column [1] and [3] report the results of equation (6) using ROA 
and ROE of suppliers as the dependent variable. The coefficients of the interaction 
term are positive and significant (α = 0.004, p<0.1 and α = 0.012, p<0.1 respectively). 
Thus, customers with high operational efficiency and trade credit provision can 
benefit suppliers in terms of future profitability. The results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 3 that the profit of customer-firm with high operational efficiency is 
higher when the supplier firm provides more trade credit. Similarly, column (2) and 
(4) report the interaction effect on customers’ ROA and ROE. The coefficients of 
“high_stfp x TC” are positively significant (α = 0.004, p<0.01 and α = 0.7, p<0.01 
respectively). The results are consistent with the hypothesis (2) which predicts that 
the profit of customer-firm with high operational efficiency is higher when the 
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supplier firm provides more trade credit. 
5.4 Subsample analysis 
In this section, we re-examine equation (7) using different subsamples, i.e., 
relative size, customer concentration, and relative cost of borrowing. First, we divide 
our sample into the high relative size and low relative size group in which high 
relative size is measured by the total asset of suppliers to the total asset of customers. 
For the profitability of suppliers, Table 5 reports that the interaction term (high_stfp x 
TC) is positively significant when suppliers have a lower relative size (ROA: α = 
0.007, p<0.1, and ROE: α = 0.033, p<0.01). It implies that suppliers can benefit more 
from providing more trade credit to productive customers when the former has 
relatively low bargaining power in terms of size. The results are consistent with the 
previous study which documents that trade credit can be served as competition tools 
under a highly competitive environment (Lee et al., 2017). For the profitability of 
customers, the results in column (3) and (4) show that customers benefit more from 
high trade credit and operational efficiency when it has low relative size. It implies 
that customers could be benefited from stronger suppliers who are willing to provide 
more trade credit to productive firms. 
Second, we divide our sample into high customer concentration (high cc) and 
low customer concentration (low cc) group. Table 6 shows that when suppliers have 
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higher customer concentration, the positive relation between the combining effect of 
operational efficiency and trade credit, and the profitability of suppliers becomes 
more pronounced. On the other hand, when customers trade with suppliers with high 
customer concentration, if these suppliers provide more trade credit to productive 
customers, it will benefit the future profitability of customers. 
Third, we divide the sample into a high relative cost of borrowing (high COBR) 
and low relative cost of borrowing (low COBR). COBR is measured by the cost of 
borrowing of the customer to the cost of borrowing of suppliers. Table 7 shows that 
when suppliers have a higher cost of borrowing, the profitability of suppliers 
becomes better if they provide more trade credit to customers with high operational 
efficiency. The results imply that providing productive customers with higher trade 
credit is a good investment when the cost of borrowing is high. For the profitability 
of customers, the interaction effect (high_stfp x TC) becomes more pronounced when 
customers have a higher cost of borrowing. It is consistent with the prior study that 
documents the risk-sharing behavior along the supply chain (Yang and Birge, 2017). 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We empirically examine how customer’s operational efficiency affects the trade 
credit provision and the impact of trade credit on earnings performance by using the 
links between US suppliers and their major customers. We find that firms with high 
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operational efficiency can easily obtain trade credit from their suppliers. The results 
are consistent with the study of Ng et al. (1999) who document suppliers tend to 
extend trade credit to a customer with a high reputation. Suppliers tend to extend 
trade credit to productive customers in order to build a long-term relationship. The 
study also examines the effect of trade credit on earnings performance. The 
interaction effect of trade credit and OE on firm performance is positively associated. 
Our results extend the study of Lee et al. (2017) who suggest that providing 
industry-average trade credit leads to a “collaborative” effect for both customers and 
suppliers. We document that suppliers provide more trade credit to the productive 
firm is a form of collaboration that improves the profitability of both supply chain 
stakeholders. Suppliers gain from future sales to productive customers and customers 
enjoy the financial flexibility from trade credit. Furthermore, we document that 
suppliers can be benefited more from extending trade credit to productive customers 
when the formers have lower bargaining power, higher customer concentration, and 
higher cost of borrowing. Customers also can be benefited from the interaction effect 
of trade credit and operational efficiency when they have higher bargaining power, 
trade with suppliers with high customer concentration and have a higher cost of 
borrowing from banks.  
Our study sheds light on the decision of the trade credit provision which is 
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closely related to customer’s operational efficiency. Moreover, our study contributes 
to the trade credit reforms in the US and Europe. The restriction on trade credit limits 
the supply of short-term financing to customers which may reduce supply chain 
efficiency. We suggest that the restriction will harm both suppliers and customers in 
terms of profitability. Furthermore, we provide implications for the trade contract for 
non-financial firms. Consistent with Bierman and Hausman (1970), suppliers need to 
consider potential sales from customers when making trade credit decisions. We 
propose that operational efficiency is an important indicator. 
 Our study has certain limitations that need to be aware of. Although we use 
different measures of trade credit and find similar results, it is hard to distinguish 
between the supply side and the demand side of trade credit. Using the current 
dataset without pricing information, our measure of trade credit could not 
differentiate the quantity and quality dimension of trade credit since suppliers could 
set a more expensive trade credit term instead of reducing the amount of trade credit 
in order to deal with the high operational risk from customers. Further research could 
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Variable definitions  
Variable Units Definition Measurement 
Variables of Interest    




× 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)/𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡]  
Operational Efficiency    
sITc ratio Industry standardized inventory 
turnover of customer 
𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑇𝑡
𝑠𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑇𝑡
 
TFP  Total factor productivity  Follow Lee and Kesavan (2019) 
Performance    
ROAs (ROAc) ratio Return on asset of suppliers 
(customers) 
Income before extraordinary 
Items / total asset t-1 
ROEs (ROEc) ratio Return on equity of suppliers 
(customers) 
Income before extraordinary 
Items/ (total asset – total equity) 
t-1 
Control Variables    
𝑐𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 %  Sales from supplier to customer over 
total supplier sales 
csale / sale 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠 (Sizec)   Natural logarithm of firm size of 
supplier (customer) 
Market price × Common share 
outstanding of supplier 
(customer) 
𝑀𝑆𝑠 (𝑀𝑆𝑐) % Natural logarithm of market share of 
supplier (customer) 
ln [𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡/ ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑠 ] 
(ln [𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡/ ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑠 ]) 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡   Ratio Natural logarithm of relative 
tangible asset 
ln [Tangible asset of customer 
over tangible asset of supplier] 
𝐶𝑂𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡   Ratio Natural logarithm of relative cost of 
borrowing (customer CoB to 
supplier CoB) 




BDR ratio Natural logarithm of customer’s 
bank credit ratio 
ln[BD/cogs] where BD = debt in 
current liabilities 








𝑗=1 ] where 𝑚𝑖𝑡 
is the number of customers of 
supplier i at time t 
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡   Year Duration of relationship The duration of supplier 
customer relationship until year t 
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Table 1 Summary Statistic  
  count mean sd p25 p50 p75 
TC 26979 1.15 2.24 -0.34 1.15 2.72 
sITc 26979 -0.04 0.53 -0.33 -0.18 0.02 
stfp 26979 -0.58 0.21 -0.70 -0.55 -0.46 
sizec 26979 9.38 1.99 8.20 9.65 10.84 
sizes 26979 4.86 2.44 3.06 4.76 6.59 
MSs 26979 -8.06 2.53 -9.71 -8.02 -6.36 
MSc 26979 -3.70 1.79 -4.79 -3.45 -2.26 
TAR 26979 4.62 2.33 3.06 4.69 6.23 
COBR 26979 -0.28 0.98 -0.66 -0.17 0.23 
BDR 26979 -3.24 1.89 -4.13 -3.13 -1.87 
ln_csale 26979 3.11 2.24 1.55 3.08 4.72 
tenure 26979 4.70 4.36 2.00 3.00 6.00 
Notes. This table provides descriptive statistics and correlations for 26,979 pair-year 




Table 2 Correlation Table 
    TC sITc stfp sizec sizes cash MSs MSc TAR COBR BDR ln_csale tenure 
TC   1.000                         
sITc   0.0741*** 1.000                       
stfp   0.126*** -0.0956*** 1.000                     
sizec   0.323*** -0.0125* -0.126*** 1.000                   
sizes   0.745*** -0.0196*** 0.230*** 0.312*** 1.000                 
cash   0.382*** 0.0569*** -0.0457*** 0.785*** 0.363*** 1.000               
MSs   0.662*** 0.0976*** -0.0385*** 0.113*** 0.506*** 0.153*** 1.000             
MSc   0.262*** 0.208*** -0.421*** 0.587*** 0.111*** 0.550*** 0.254*** 1.000           
TAR   -0.512*** 0.0404*** -0.337*** 0.402*** -0.613*** 0.298*** -0.467*** 0.410*** 1.000         
COBR   0.0713*** 0.0557*** 0.007 -0.168*** 0.0904*** -0.154*** 0.0867*** -0.0458*** -0.211*** 1.000       
BDR   -0.0277*** -0.0444*** -0.0588*** 0.171*** -0.0275*** 0.165*** 0.0208*** 0.000 0.196*** -0.185*** 1.000     
ln_csale   0.959*** 0.0634*** 0.142*** 0.335*** 0.761*** 0.396*** 0.678*** 0.254*** -0.527*** 0.0567*** -0.0330*** 1.000   
tenure   0.318*** 0.0697*** 0.0573*** 0.196*** 0.201*** 0.254*** 0.239*** 0.199*** -0.0459*** 0.0125* 0.0354*** 0.332*** 1.000 





Table 3 Operational Efficiency and Trade Credit 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] 
  Inventory Productivity   TFP   Combined 
Dependent Variable: TC TC_sale     TC TC_sale     TC TC_sale    
  b/t b/t      b/t b/t      b/t b/t    
L.sITc 0.025 ** 0.031 *           0.026 ** 0.026 * 
  2.28  1.91            2.410  1.690  
L.stfp         0.088 ** 0.083 *   0.094 ** 0.093 ** 
          2.260  1.890    2.360  2.060  
L.TC 0.072 ***     0.065 ***     0.068 ***                  
  3.25       3.050       3.140                   
L.TC_sale    0.116 ***    0.109 ***     0.112 *** 
     5.18       5.070       5.080  
L.MSc 0.034 ** -0.099 *** 0.049 *** -0.086 ***  0.045 *** -0.087 *** 
  2.18  -4.33    3.530  -4.090    2.940  -3.710  
L.MSs -0.06 *** -0.196 *** -0.057 *** -0.202 ***  -0.060 *** -0.200 *** 
  4.24  -8.62    -4.180  -8.710    -4.350  -8.790  
L.cc -0.02 * 0.018    -0.018 * 0.021 *   -0.018  0.020  
  1.8  1.5    -1.680  1.750    -1.620  1.620  
TAR -0.135 *** 0.204 *** -0.135 *** 0.198 ***  -0.140 *** 0.200 *** 
  9.27  12.24    -9.590  12.030    -9.610  12.130  
COBR 0.046 *** 0.064 *** 0.046 *** 0.063 ***  0.045 *** 0.063 *** 
  6.33  8.28    6.570  8.590    6.360  8.380  
BDR 0.016 *** 0.004    0.016 *** 0.003    0.017 *** 0.004  
  4.32  0.81    4.380  0.680    4.500  0.840  
ln_csale 0.931 *** 0.658 *** 0.935 *** 0.664 ***  0.933 *** 0.661 *** 
  91.01  44.75    96.230  46.300    91.250  44.910  
tenure1_5 -0.055 *** -0.035    -0.052 *** -0.029    -0.052 *** -0.031  
  2.93  -1.23    -2.720  -1.020    -2.720  -1.100  
tenure6_10 -0.038 ** -0.037 *   -0.035 ** -0.031    -0.034 ** -0.032  
  2.47  -1.71    -2.270  -1.460    -2.160  -1.460  
tenure16_20 0.022  0.088 **   0.015  0.085 **   0.016  0.084 ** 
  0.93  2.5    0.620  2.420    0.680  2.400  
tenure21 0.038  0.14 *** 0.034  0.144 ***  0.036  0.137 *** 
  1.03  2.66    0.910  2.750    0.970  2.630  
constant -1.559 *** -8.424 *** -1.433 *** -8.388 ***  -1.437 *** -8.363 *** 
  7.84  -36.76    -7.610  -36.280    -7.400  -35.540  
N 20107 20107   20176 20176   19649 19649 
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r2_a 0.979 0.844   0.979 0.847   0.979 0.846 
Cluster pair, year pair, year      pair, year pair, year   pair, year pair, year    
pair_FE Yes Yes      Yes Yes   Yes Yes    
year_FE Yes Yes      Yes Yes   Yes Yes    
Notes. This table reports OLS estimation of the association between one-year lagged 
operational efficiency proxies (L.sITc and L.stfp) and trade credit proxies (TC and TC_sales) 
over the period 1977–2016. Models [1] and [2] use standardized inventory turnover of 
customers (sITc) as a proxy for operational efficiency, whereas we use total factor 
productivity of customers (stfp) in Model [3] and [4]. We include both proxies of operational 
efficiency proxies in Model [5] and [6]. T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. The 
robust standard error is used and adjusted for double clustering at pair year level. ***, **, 





Table 4 The effect of operational efficiency and trade credit on profitability of 
customers and suppliers  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  ROAs ROAc    ROEs ROEc    
  b/t b/t    b/t b/t    
L.high_stfp x L.TC 0.004 * 0.004 *** 0.012 * 0.007 *** 
  1.70  3.51  1.86  2.84  
L.high_stfp -0.004  -0.005 * -0.009  -0.006  
  0.56  -1.78  -0.44  -1.12  
L.TC 0.002  -0.002  0.02  -0.003  
  0.30  -0.90  0.61  -0.92  
Supplier-based controls                 
L.sizes 0.023 *** 0.000  0.065 *** -0.003  
  6.75  0.07  6.62  -1.28  
L.MSs -0.003  -0.006 *** 0.009  -0.01 *** 
  0.88  -3.92  0.75  -3.15  
L.ROAs 0.057 * 0.007 *                     
  1.79  1.8                      
L.ROEs       0.101 *** 0.002  
        4.00  0.75  
L.LEVs 0.059 *** 0.006 ** 0.368 *** 0.011 * 
  2.59  2.39  8.41  1.85  
L.SGs 0.008  0.004 * 0.004  0.008 ** 
  0.98  1.92  0.16  2.11  
ages -0.004  0.001  0.022  -0.008  
  0.31   0.28   0.62  -1.00  
Customer-based controls                 
L.sizec -0.001  0.020 *** -0.006  0.026 *** 
  0.29   4.58   -0.58  3.36  
L.MSc -0.02 ** -0.007 * -0.085 *** -0.011  
  2.46  -1.81  -3.24  -1.21  
L.ROAc 0.053  0.112 **                     
  1.32  2.2                      
L.ROEc       0.089  0.133 *** 
        0.79  3.44  
L.LEVc 0.02  0.064 *** 0.118  0.004  
  0.87  3.11  1.50  0.09  
L.SGc 0.008  0.015 * 0.055 * 0.026  
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  0.60  1.69  1.66  1.52  
agec 0.001  -0.02 ** -0.037  -0.033  
  0.03  -2.44  -0.52  -1.59  
Supply chain characteristics                 
L.TAR 0.036 *** -0.015 *** 0.145 *** -0.029 *** 
  5.10  -4.33  5.49  -4.39  
L.COBR -0.005  0  -0.019 * 0.003  
  1.53  -0.20  -1.71  1.59  
L.BDR -0.004 ** -0.003 ** -0.012 *** -0.007 *** 
  2.39  -2.56  -2.60  -3.94  
L.cc -0.005  0.001  -0.029 *** 0.001  
  1.52  1.07  -2.85  0.51  
L.ln_TCA -0.003  -0.003 ** -0.011  -0.005 * 
  0.78  -2.55  -1.06  -1.91  
L.ln_csale 0.008  -0.006 *** 0.015  -0.009 ** 
  0.91  -3.19  0.43  -2.18  
tenure1_5 0.003  0.000  0.039  0.000  
  0.30  -0.15  1.32  -0.03  
tenure6_10 0.001  0.000  0.025  0.001  
  0.21  -0.13  1.32  0.31  
tenure16_20 0.002  -0.001  -0.022  -0.002  
  0.25  -0.46  -1.05  -0.45  
tenure21 0.021  0.008 * 0.007  0.011  
  1.57  1.66  0.20  1.39  
constant -0.477 *** -0.105 * -1.644 *** 0.005  
  3.28  -1.79  -4.67  0.04  
N 16385 16380 16386 16381 
r2_a 0.582 0.593 0.581 0.692 
Cluster pair, year pair, year    pair, year pair, year    
pair_FE Yes Yes    Yes Yes    
year_FE Yes Yes    Yes Yes    
Notes. This table reports OLS estimation of the association between the one-year lagged 
interaction effects of customers' operational efficiency and trade credit (L.high_stfp x L.TC) 
and profitability of customers and suppliers over the period 1977–2016. We employ an 
indicator variable (high_stfp), which is equal to 1 when the stfp of the customer is higher 
than the industry median. Models [1] and [3] report the results using the return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of suppliers as dependent variables whereas model [2] 
and [4] using ROA and ROE of customers. T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. 
Robust standard error is used and adjusted for double clustering at pair year level. ***, **, 
and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Interaction effect of operational efficiency and trade credit on the 
profitability of customers and suppliers between high relative size and low 
relative size 
Panel A: Return on Asset (ROA)                  
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   









size   
  b/t b/t   b/t b/t      
L.high_stfp x L.TC -0.001  0.007 *   0.005 *** 0.003 ***   
  0.25  1.77    2.61  2.81    
L.high_stfp 0.011  -0.008    -0.009 * -0.002    
  1.4  -0.77    -1.76  -0.85    
L.TC -0.003  0.006    0  -0.003    
  0.46  0.55    -0.03  -1.26    
N 7705 8366   7706 8372   
r2_a 0.479 0.597   0.583 0.622   
       
                      
Panel B: Return on Equity (ROE)                  









size   
  b/t b/t   b/t b/t      
L.high_stfp x L.TC -0.013  0.033 ***   0.009 ** 0.005 **   
  1.36  3.11    2.18  2.31    
L.high_stfp 0.072* * -0.025    -0.013  -0.002    
  1.75  -1.13    -1.27  -0.3    
L.TC 0.051  -0.007    -0.001  -0.006    
  1.32  -0.16    -0.17  -1.52    
N 7705 8367   7706 8373   
r2_a 0.553 0.594   0.672 0.737   
Cluster pair, year pair, year   pair, year pair, year     
pair_FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
year_FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Supplier_based_controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Customer_based_controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Supply_chain_characteristics Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
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Notes. Panel A reports OLS estimation of the association between the one-year lagged 
interaction effects of customer's operational efficiency and trade credit (L.high_stfp x L.TC) 
and returns on asset (ROA) of customers and suppliers for high and low relative size 
subsample over the period 1977–2016. Relative size is measured by the total asset of 
suppliers to the total asset of customers. An observation is considered as high relative size 
when the relative size is higher than the median in year t. Models [1] and [2] report the 
results using the return on asset (ROA) of suppliers as dependent variables whereas model [3] 
and [4] using ROA of customers.  Panel B reports similar OLS estimation using the return 
on equity (ROE) as the dependent variable. T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. 
Robust standard error is used and adjusted for double clustering at pair year level. ***, **, 




Table 6 Interaction effect of operational efficiency and trade credit on the 
profitability of customers and suppliers between high customer concentration 
(high cc) and low customer concentration (low cc) 
Panel A: Return on Asset (ROA)                  
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   
Dependent Variable ROA [supplier]   ROA [customer]   
  high cc low cc   high cc low cc   
  b/t b/t   b/t b/t      
L.high_stfp x L.TC 0.008 ** 0.000    0.005 *** 0.003 **   
  2.26  0.03    3.00  2.42    
L.high_stfp -0.008  0.002    -0.003  -0.005    
  0.67  0.27    -0.61  -1.5    
L.TC 0  -0.003    -0.002  -0.003    
  0.05  -0.3    -0.96  -0.95    
N 7803 7395   7801 7387   
r2_a 0.6 0.55   0.592 0.593   
        
                      
Panel B: Return on Equity (ROE)                  
Dependent Variable ROE [supplier]   ROE [customer]   
  high cc low cc   high cc low cc   
  b/t b/t   b/t b/t      
L.high_stfp x L.TC 0.015  0.007    0.008 *** 0.003    
  1.6  0.95    2.71  1.38    
L.high_stfp 0.006  -0.015    -0.003  -0.002    
  0.16  -0.64    -0.42  -0.32    
L.TC 0.033  0.008    -0.007  -0.004    
  0.71  0.28    -1.4  -0.71    
N 7805 7395   7803 7387   
r2_a 0.595 0.552   0.69 0.699   
Cluster pair, year pair, year   pair, year pair, year     
pair_FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
year_FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Supplier_based_controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Customer_based_controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Supply_chain_characteristics Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Notes. Panel A reports OLS estimation of the association between the one-year lagged 
interaction effects of customers' operational efficiency and trade credit (L.high_stfp x L.TC) 
and returns on asset (ROA) of customers and suppliers for high and low customer 
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concentration subsample over the period 1977–2016. An observation is considered as high 
customer concentration when the customer concentration is higher than the median in year t. 
Models [1] and [2] report the results using the return on asset (ROA) of suppliers as 
dependent variables whereas model [3] and [4] using ROA of customers. Panel B reports 
similar OLS estimation using the return on equity (ROE) as the dependent variable. 
T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. Robust standard error is used and adjusted 
for double clustering at pair year level. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed statistical 





Table 7 Interaction effect of operational efficiency and trade credit on the 
profitability of customers and suppliers between high relative cost of borrowing 
(high COBR) and low relative cost of borrowing (low COBR) 
Panel A: Return on Asset (ROA)                  
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   
Dependent Variable ROA [supplier]   ROA [customer]   
  high COBR low COBR   high COBR low COBR   
  b/t b/t   b/t b/t      
L.high_stfp x L.TC -0.001  0.009 **   0.006 *** 0.004 ***   
  0.34  2.34    3.68  3.37    
L.high_stfp 0.012  -0.019    -0.009 *** -0.004    
  1.5  -1.64    -2.61  -1.05    
L.TC 0.004  -0.005    -0.001  0    
  0.47  -0.55    -0.39  0    
N 7232 6875   7232 6875   
r2_a 0.57 0.564   0.571 0.642   
       
                      
Panel B: Return on Equity (ROE)                  
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   
Dependent Variable ROE [supplier]   ROE [customer]   
  high COBR low COBR   high COBR low COBR   
  b/t b/t   sub/t b/t      
L.high_stfp x L.TC -0.002  0.023 **   0.01 *** 0.005 **   
  0.29  2.49    3.2  2.29    
L.high_stfp 0.038  -0.045    -0.011  -0.008    
  1.21  -1.5    -1.6  -1.12    
L.TC 0.039  -0.012    -0.004  0.001    
  1.13  -0.25    -0.65  0.33    
N 7232 6877   7232 6877   
r2_a 0.502 0.614   0.647 0.765   
Cluster pair, year pair, year   pair, year pair, year      
pair_FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
year_FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Supplier_based_controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Customer_based_controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Supply_chain_characteristics Yes Yes   Yes Yes      
Notes. Panel A reports OLS estimation of the association between the one-year lagged 
interaction effects of customers' operational efficiency and trade credit (L.high_stfp x L.TC) 
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and returns on asset (ROA) of customers and suppliers for high and low cost of borrowing 
(COBR) subsample over the period 1977–2016. COBR is measured by the cost of borrowing 
of the customer to the cost of borrowing of suppliers. An observation is considered as high 
COBR when the relative cost of borrowing is higher than the median in year t. Models [1] 
and [2] report the results using the return on asset (ROA) of suppliers as dependent variables 
whereas model [3] and [4] using ROA of customers. Panel B reports similar OLS estimation 
using the return on equity (ROE) as the dependent variable. T-statistics are presented below 
the coefficients. Robust standard error is used and adjusted for double clustering at pair year 






Table 8 Instrumental Variable (transportation infrastructure)       
  First stage TC TC_sale 
  [1] [2] [3] 
transportation 0.092 ***         
  6.11          
L.stfp[instrument]    1.372 ** 1.46 * 
     1.98  1.86  
L.TC -0.022  0.058 ***    
  7.54  4.2     
L.MSc 0.002  0.078 *** -0.049 ** 
  1.31  4.05  -2.04  
L.MSs 0.003 *** -0.055 *** -0.194 *** 
  2.74  5.39  -14.12  
L.cc -0.004 ** -0.009  0.027 ** 
  1.97  1.17  2.57  
TAR 0.001  -0.133 *** 0.201 *** 
  1.14  10.86  13.62  
COBR 0.001 * 0.045 *** 0.061 *** 
  1.84  7.57  8.94  
BDR -0.004 ** 0.018 *** 0.003  
  2.49  5.53  0.72  
ln_casle -0.016 *** 0.937 *** 0.657 *** 
  3.23  89.14  50.84  
tenure1_5 -0.016 *** -0.034  -0.013  
  4.44  1.48  -0.47  
tenure6_10 0.014 *** -0.02  -0.017  
  2.8  1  -0.75  
tenure16_20 0.034 *** 0.006  0.073 *** 
  4.16  0.27  2.91  
tenure21     0.006  0.113 ** 
      0.15  2.3  
L.TC_sale        0.099 *** 
         5.8  
N 16607 16709 16709 
r2_a 0.848 0.98 0.836 
F-statistic  42.420 42.712 
pair_FE Yes Yes Yes    
year_FE Yes Yes Yes    
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Notes. We use transportation infrastructure as an instrumental variable for customers’ 
operational efficiency. T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. 
 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 = ln (
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
)  
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. We report the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for model [2] and [3]. Given that 




Table IA1 Supply Chain Sales-weighted Operational Efficiency and Trade 
Credit 
  [1] [2] 
OE: w_sITc w_tfp    
  b/t b/t    
L.OE 0.099 ** 0.228 * 
  2.04  1.89  
L.TC 0.072 *** 0.07 *** 
  3.26  3.03  
L.MSc 0.034 ** 0.048 *** 
  2.19  3.46  
L.MSs -0.06 *** -0.061 *** 
  4.23  -4.21  
L.cc -0.019 * -0.009  
  1.76  -0.98  
TAR -0.135 *** -0.131 *** 
  9.28  -8.97  
COBR 0.046 *** 0.047 *** 
  6.35  6.6  
BDR 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 
  4.29  4.33  
ln_csale 0.931 *** 0.937 *** 
  91.11  97.1  
tenure1_5 -0.055 *** -0.051 *** 
  2.91  -2.7  
tenure6_10 -0.038 ** -0.035 ** 
  2.48  -2.3  
tenure16_20 0.023  0.015  
  0.96  0.61  
tenure21 0.04  0.034  
  1.1  0.94  
constant -1.558 *** -1.492 *** 
  7.82  -7.73  
N 20107 20176 
r2_a 0.979 0.979 
Cluster pair, year pair, year    
pair_FE Yes Yes    
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year_FE Yes Yes    
Notes. This table reports OLS estimation of the association between one-year lagged supply 
chain-weighted operational efficiency proxies (L.w_sITc and L.w_stfp) and trade credit 
proxies (TC) over the period 1977–2016. Model [1] uses supply chain sales-weighted 
standardized inventory turnover of customers (sITc) as a proxy for operational efficiency, 
whereas we use supply chain sales-weighted standardized total factor productivity of 
customers (w_stfp) in Model [2]. T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. The robust 
standard error is used and adjusted for double clustering at pair year level. ***, **, and * 




Table IA 2 Operational Efficiency and Trade Credit (account payable as proxy) 
  [1] [2] 
  ln_apc apc_cogsc 
  b/t b/t    
L.stfp 0.108 * 0.021 * 
  1.85  1.78  
L.ln_apc 0.504 ***                  
  8.17                   
L.MSc 0.09 ** -0.009 ** 
  2.55  -2.18  
L.MSs 0.038 *** 0.003  
  5.65  1.62  
L.cc -0.015 *** -0.002  
  3.36  -1.54  
TAR 0.163 *** 0.01 *** 
  9.58  2.92  
COBR -0.003  0.001  
  0.67  0.53  
BDR -0.002  0.004 *** 
  0.44  3.27  
ln_csale 0.06 *** 0  
  9.08  0.31  
tenure1_5 -0.026 * -0.003  
  1.74  -0.87  
tenure6_10 -0.009  -0.003  
  0.74  -1.06  
tenure16_20 -0.03 * -0.007 ** 
  1.67  -2.16  
tenure21 -0.042  -0.009  
  1.28  -1.34  
L.apc_cogsc    0.028  
     1.03  
N 21262 20238 
r2_a 0.986 0.897 
Cluster pair, year pair, year    
pair_FE Yes Yes    
year_FE Yes Yes    
Notes. This table reports OLS estimation of the association between one-year lagged 
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standardized total factor productivity (L.stfp) and trade credit proxies (ln_apc and apc_cogsc) 
over the period 1977–2016. Model [1] use the natural logarithm of account payable of 
customers (ln_apc) as a proxy for trade credit, whereas we use account payable to cogs of 
goods sold ratio of customers (apc_cogsc) in Model [2]. The measures follow Yag and Birge 
(2017) and Chod et al. (2019). T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. The robust 
standard error is used and adjusted for double clustering at pair year level. ***, **, and * 




Table IA3 The effect of operational efficiency and trade credit on profitability of 
customers and suppliers 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  ROAs ROAc ROEs ROEc    
  b/t b/t b/t b/t    
L.high_stfp[instrument] # L.TC 0.004 ** 0.004 *** 0.015 *** 0.006 *** 
  2.4  6.68  2.93  5.01  
L.TC 0.001  -0.003 * 0.027 ** -0.004  
  0.27  -1.67  2.05  -1.4  
L.high_stfp[instrument] -0.004  -0.003  -0.012  -0.002  
Supplier-based controls             
  0.71   -1.48   -0.81   -0.57   
L.sizes 0.02 *** -0.001  0.055 *** -0.005 *** 
  8.11  -0.72  8.02  -2.88  
L.MSs -0.002  -0.006 *** 0.008  -0.01 *** 
  0.44  -5.02  0.82  -4.38  
L.ROAs 0.067 *** 0.008 **                     
  6.67  2.51                      
L.ROEs       0.094 *** 0.002  
        11.42  1.3  
L.LEVs 0.058 *** 0.004  0.323 *** 0.008  
  6.43  1.46  13.03  1.4  
L.SGs 0.004  0.004 ** -0.016  0.009 *** 
  0.76  2.29  -1.02  2.64  
ages 0.001  0.005  0.022  -0.002  
  0.09   1.4   0.77   -0.25   
Customer-based controls                 
L.sizec -0.002  0.02 *** -0.006  0.026 *** 
  0.52   16.78   -0.63   11.37   
L.MSc -0.021 *** -0.004 ** -0.076 *** -0.004  
  3.82  -2.22  -4.97  -1.2  
L.ROAc 0.042  0.103 ***                     
  1.31  9.75                      
L.ROEc       0.032  0.125***  
        0.75  12.61  
L.LEVc 0  0.056 *** 0.067  0.001  
  0.01  8.08  1.14  0.1  
L.SGc 0.012  0.009 ** 0.074 ** 0.015 * 
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  1.05  2.25  2.2  1.93  
agec 0.035  -0.019 ** 0.011  -0.024  
  1.33  -2.19  0.15  -1.41  
Supply chain characteristics                 
L.TAR 0.038 *** -0.016 *** 0.132 *** -0.031 *** 
  8.5  -11.1  10.45  -10.77  
L.COBR -0.005 *** -0.001  -0.025 *** 0.003 *** 
  2.85  -0.87  -4.67  2.73  
L.BDR -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.012 *** -0.007 *** 
  2.69  -6.43  -3.1  -7.92  
L.cc -0.005 ** 0.001  -0.028 *** 0.001  
  2.03  1.37  -3.75  0.67  
L.ln_TCA -0.002  -0.003 *** -0.012  -0.004 ** 
  0.56  -2.77  -1.34  -2.14  
L.ln_csale 0.01 * -0.006 *** 0.014  -0.009 ** 
  1.86  -3.28  0.9  -2.35  
tenure1_5 0  0  0.027  0  
  0.02  -0.16  1.07  0.03  
tenure6_10 0  0  0.019  0.002  
  0.08  -0.1  1.08  0.42  
tenure16_20 0.005  0  -0.011  0  
  0.63  -0.03  -0.46  0.09  
tenure21 0.028 * 0.01 ** 0.027  0.014  
  1.91  2.06  0.66  1.43  
N 13551 13547 13552 13548 
Cluster pair, year pair, year pair, year pair, year    
pair_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes    
year_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Notes. This table reports two-stage least squared estimation of the association between the 
one-year lagged interaction effects of customers' operational efficiency and trade credit 
(L.high_stfp[instrument] x L.TC) and profitability of customers and suppliers over the period 
1977–2016. We use transportation infrastructure as an instrumental variable for operational 
efficiency in stage 1 and use the instrumented operational efficiency (high_stfp[instrument]) 
in stage 2. Models [1] and [3] report the results using the return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE) of suppliers as dependent variables whereas model [2] and [4] using ROA 
and ROE of customers. T-statistics are presented below the coefficients. Robust standard 
error is used and adjusted for double clustering at pair year level. ***, **, and * indicate 
two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
